How Americans shifted from civic optimism to political polarization.
In 1963 the seminal political scientists Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba coined the term “civic culture” to describe the exceptional nature of American democracy. Compared to Western Europe, American democracy had features that were unusual. The following were essential features of this political culture: citizen optimism, confidence in government, generalized trust of other citizens, consensus between the parties on the policies of post war reconstruction of Europe, and civil discourse between political combatants. American citizens also exhibited different behavior: they were more engaged in their communities via volunteer activities, they exhibited less suspicion of others’ motives, and they were more involved in political discourse within their families and in the community. Women were also more engaged in familial political discussions. Voting rates were higher and “we’re all in it together” was a common sentiment.
In today’s U.S. political system polarization, distrust, lack of confidence in major institutions, and contentiousness have taken hold. Robert Putnam1 described this phenomenon as “Bowling Alone,” a narrative in which citizens withdraw from communities into the private life of family and work. Earlier Morris Janowitz (1978; 1983) had pointed to declining civic consciousness, symbolized by the rejection of the ‘citizen-soldier’ model of citizenship, as a major social change. The decision to end the draft in 1973 and turn to an all-volunteer army signaled the death of this concept. In this view citizen rights then became a more compelling issue than citizen responsibilities. In both explanations the result is declining civic consciousness and patriotism.
Seymour Lipset2 in 1996 offered an alternative to these perspectives. He focused on the return to normalcy that post- war policies and the reconstruction of Europe produced in the U.S. The result was a resurgence of classic American cultural narratives. American individualism revived from its slumbers in the ‘50s when elites emphasized collective action and social mobilization to combat Russian aggression; to reconstruct Europe; and to avoid nuclear annihilation. A more activist model of citizenship emerged. A revival of populism energized Americans, particularly younger generations, which gave rise to the turbulent ‘60s.
The rise of neo-liberalism was another development in the ‘60s, symbolized by the Goldwater 1964 Presidential campaign’s motto of “a choice, not an echo.” It became a dominant political ideology with its focus on the virtues of capitalism and individual entrepreneurship. Conservatives mobilized socially and ideologically to oppose the ideas and programs embedded in Roosevelt’s New Deal and an activist approach to government. It was the beginning of the renewed battle in America over the proper role of government in society.
Classic features of the American narrative re-surfaced in this return to normalcy. Two developments, however, insured that the new ‘normal’ would not approximate the older classic model that Almond and Verba described. First, the globalization that the U.S. and Britain had pioneered via the economic and political alliances they formed across the world embedded the U.S. in a world wide web of relationships. This development undercut the classic narrative of the U.S. as independent from ‘foreign entanglements’ that the Founders had envisaged. One purpose of these policies was to ‘tame’ nationalism and reduce the likelihood of war. But this very process was also a source of enormous contention in U.S. politics, among both elites and the public. Many citizens feared the results of diminished national autonomy that globalization produced. Free trade, fear of immigrants, and worry about foreign terrorism now top the list of the public’s concerns that elites must respond to. The Perot movement in the 1990s responded to these concerns and legitimated the first two claims against globalization. They have since become the basis for Trump’s foreign policies.
Secondly, the growing importance of education, especially higher education, has intensified the narrative of the ‘individual’ as the source of societal progress. The ‘individual’ is now the main construct in the narrative of how American society ‘works’ and enacts ‘progress’ in many realms. This construct now eclipses communities, family, religion, and citizenship as the main institution in society. Social psychologists have sometimes described this development as an epidemic of narcissism. In fact, it is a culturally sanctioned movement in favor of the individual right to determine what is rational action under the circumstances they are facing. In this version of the American creed the well socialized individual (read well educated) internalizes both rights and responsibilities. This becomes the basis for their actions. If, for example, the U.S. faces serious foreign threats, such a person would consider volunteering for service, even though Congress ended the formal drafting of young adults into the army in 1973. As this example indicates, this model of society has eclipsed that of classic citizenship. The ‘soldier-citizen’ model is indeed dead.
This cultural shift has changed U.S. politics by sanctioning populism and the authority of public opinion. The opinion of individuals now matters more given their new cultural status. Under this credo the aggregate opinion of the public becomes more authoritative than political parties as ‘the voice of the people.’ Political elites are now beholden to public opinion and polling becomes a major activity and source of policy. Political parties and elites are now weaker as a result.
Similarly, intensified individualism sanctions the authority of opinion against the judgement of experts. As a result, expertise becomes devalued as currency in the political arena and society at large. This tendency elevates the authority of amateurs over experts in many spheres. Given access to the web, many believe that the unvetted information available there gives them the knowledge base to challenge highly qualified experts. Many parents now believe in the quack medical knowledge on the web that warns against vaccination. They are now free to ignore the advice of their pediatrician, who is likely to urge them to vaccinate their children. This is a radical change. When the polio vaccine was discovered in the ‘50s vaccination rates soared above 95%. New York City even offered to give Dr. Jonas Salk, the inventor of the vaccine, a ticker tape parade in 1955 in honor of his discovery.
With the eclipse of citizenship and the rise of public opinion as a political force, society is dealing with a new and more potent form of populism.
This cultural change, like globalization, has produced important cleavages in society. It is the basis for the many social movements that have grown up since the ‘60s demanding rights and equality for minorities of all kinds, e.g., gays; youth; ethnic minorities; women; children; and immigrants.
Weakened political parties have become unable to deal with this discontent constructively, leading to polarized politics where social movements on each side have mobilized and now dominate. Traditionalists and conservatives have organized and taken a reactive stance to demands and changes in law and practice. For example, Evangelicals have mobilized to oppose gay marriage; abortion rights and other changes in legal and social practices. Many whites have responded to populist politicians like Trump by opposing what they view as ‘special treatment’ for immigrants; the ‘dreamers’; and minorities. Intensified white nationalism has been one outcome of this conflict over rights.
The new American creed has also impacted the public’s view of the role of government in the economy. Here too it has intensified division. The legacy of the ‘30s and the New Deal continue but conservatives have successfully challenged this legacy. Neo-liberalism is now a politically successful ideology that dominates the Republican Party and corporate America. Conservatives and evangelicals support the belief that un-regulated capitalism is a societal good that no one should challenge. Cries of ‘socialism’ emanate from these groups when liberals propose modest regulatory reforms of corporations, e.g., regulation of the internet; reducing corporate monopoly power.
Entrepreneurship gains unparalleled legitimacy under this canopy as a source of social ‘progress.’ Intensified individualism also legitimates extreme income inequality that has been characteristic of the American economy since the 1970s. In that era salary and wage differentials between the college educated and those with high school or less became pronounced. This credo sanctions levels of inequality not seen since the roaring ‘20s.
With the eclipse of citizenship and the rise of public opinion as a political force, society is dealing with a new and more potent form of populism. It will have important consequences for political order. With expertise and knowledge removed as barriers to political success, these movements have the power to undermine institutional authority and rationality in democratic societies. Amateurs now reign in place of experts. Public popularity and showmanship masquerade as administrative competence. One possibility is that we are now witnessing a movement toward a more authoritarian state committed to anti-modernist agendas. Trumpism may be just the beginning of a march to autocracy.
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Notes
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Lipset, Seymour M. 1996. American Exceptionalism: The Double Edged Sword. New York: Norton.
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