On the current state of Egypt's fraught political landscape.
As the third anniversary of Egypt’s uprising nears, pessimism permeates analyses of the country’s political trajectory. The Tamarud-inspired mobilization forced the country’s lead generals back to work after a 12-month retirement from governing and Minister of Defense Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi removed the elected president, launched a political roadmap, and appointed a slew of civilians to run a state untouched by the revolution.
State violence against groups like the Muslim Brotherhood is now an accepted norm and the population, it appears, will sanction any amount of bloodletting and jailing against them. Other groups, activists, and academics have also fallen on the wrong side of this junta. Revolutionaries are arrested from their homes and now occupy the same jails from which Mubarak’s cronies are now leaving, as one court case after another clears their crimes.
The military’s newly approved constitution is touted in Egypt and abroad as a secular document that eliminates the religious underpinnings that former president Morsi and his group inserted. Nearly no one points out, however, that the expanded military privileges that Morsi inserted, remain. Yet, of the 38% of the electorate that participated in the recent referendum, 98% endorsed the constitution. Those high percentages are figures Mubarak could only have ever dreamed of achieving. Overt rigging on election day may have been negligible, but only because the security establishment cracked down on “No” activists. Voters played with fire if they bothered themselves with the futile dissent of actually casting a negative ballot.
Now, debate has turned to whether the often sunglass clad general should run for president or not. While people with no inside information debate the topic, arguments continue to break out over the terms, “coup,” “revolution,” and “democracy”. The US government rambles on about staying on the course of the democratic roadmap and not meddling in Egypt’s affairs. Meanwhile, former Mubarak insiders and formal opposition figures are reemerging to tell the world that given a choice between democracy and autocracy, Egyptians want order and that must be respected. Revolutionaries scoff at this state of affairs, but speak of the revolution in the past tense. Today, the spirit of the January 25th uprising exists more as an idea than a living political process.
Yet, only a fool would declare that Egypt’s situation has arrived at a finalized outcome. Protesters shocked the world by defeating a robust security apparatus, ending Gamal Mubarak’s likely succession, and forcing the removal of Hosni Mubarak. These were unthinkable just over three years ago.
Consider the change that has transpired: when the military intervened in February 2011 to exile Mubarak from the presidency, analysts argued that the regime had not changed and the generals sought Mubarakism without Mubarak. Indeed, the military used Egypt’s instability as a power grab not only to protect but also to bolster its political and economic standing. After increased military attacks on civilians over a protracted 17-month period, the Muslim Brotherhood wiggled its way into the transition by cutting a deal with the army. But they were no match for the generals or the state and proved to be incapable of unpartisan rule. The unreformed state’s unwillingness to help govern combined with Morsi’s tone-deaf policies heightened Egyptians’ concerns and fears. When the people finally rejected the Brotherhood’s rule and revolution’s promise, a majority of them rushed back into the army’s outstretched grasp.
Regime change did not occur in 2011—it happened in 2013. Initially, the state remained intact despite a reshuffling of its personnel. Now, former Mubarak cronies are returning to politics and the pages of daily newspapers as the stock market rebounds with investors’ hopes that the revolution is over.
As similar as this new junta may appear to be to Mubarak’s regime, three years of tumult has produced significant changes in the political landscape. While many of the old faces are returning and the police and state security are back on the streets, the regime that al-Sisi informally oversees is much more narrow, violent, and weaker than the formidable one Mubarak dominated for so long.
... aspirations for greater political, economic, and social progress appear to have entered a bleak stage ...
While the revolution’s aspirations for greater political, economic, and social progress appear to have entered a bleak stage, these are also dark days for those trying to govern from the seats of a weakened state. Authority now flows in and out of the office of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces—as well as military intelligence. Never did Mubarak govern over such precarious foundations.
Because of these shifting political conditions, Al-Sisi and the generals need to rapidly build a strong regime without aggravating the grievances that initially sparked the uprising (and have yet to be redressed). Not since the early days of the Free Officers has being Egypt’s leader been such a popular and perilous position. The difference is that the Free Officers had much more to offer in terms of a social contract than this lot does. Whatever began three years ago in Egypt remains an ongoing process that no single event will determine. What is certain is that as sure as the generals work to build a strong regime, they will also plant the seeds of future resistance against them.
See the entirety of this blog series on the Egyptian uprising, beginning with the late Samer Soliman's epilogue excerpt written immediately after the outbreak of protests in Tahrir.
Joshua Stacher is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kent State University. He is the author of Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt & Syria.
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